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DEMOCRACYS PARADOX:  POPULAR RULE AS A
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMIT ON FOREIGN POLICY
PROMOTING POPULAR RULE
HARRY F. TEPKER*
So it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the
growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation
and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.1
With these words, the President of the United States embraced a view of
Americas purpose in the world that seems to reflect the same optimism
articulated in Professor Noah Feldmans account of an epochal event in the
annals of the interaction between Islam and democracy.2  Professor Feldmans
argument is developed in two books advocating democracy as a policy for the
reconstruction of Iraq.3  The issues arising from the Presidents pronouncement
follow not only the events of September 11, 2001 and the assault on Saddam
Husseins regime in Iraq, but also  in the world of ideas  an avalanche of
literature predicting hope and expressing despair regarding the clash of
civilizations,4 an end of history,5 the future of freedom,6 and the folly of
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but require strong institutional foundations of law and order.).
6.  FAREED ZAKARIA, THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM: ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY AT HOME AND
ABROAD (2003) (drawing attention to the problem of illiberal democracy in the third world,
including the Middle East).
7. Compare JOHN B. JUDIS, THE FOLLY OF EMPIRE: WHAT GEORGE W. BUSH COULD
LEARN FROM THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND WOODROW WILSON (2004) (arguing that American
leaders have forgotten lessons from interventions in Mexico, the Philippines, and Vietnam that
unilateral American efforts to impose democracy result in futile, indecisive conflict, or worse,
defeats), with FERGUSON, supra note 5, at 301 (Unlike most European critics of the United
States . . . I believe the world needs an effective liberal empire and that the United States is
the best candidate for the job.).
8. Robert Kagan, Evil Rising with More, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2004, at 12 (reviewing
FELDMAN, WHAT WE OWE IRAQ, supra note 3, and noting there is no mistaking [Feldmans]
disappointment with some of the Bush administrations failures in Iraq).
9. Second Inaugural Address, supra note 1. 
10. President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation (Mar. 19, 2003), at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030319-17.html.
empire.7  So much of this literature is political science, history, or grand
futuristic speculation that it is beyond the ken of a professor of American
constitutional law.  Thus, this is the skeptical essay of a confused citizen, not
an expert, bewildered by recent headlines and pronouncements that seem bold,
even reckless and out of touch with humbler elements of American tradition,
cautionary lessons of history, and our nations own constitutional politics.
Professor Feldman does not speak for current American policy, nor does he
purport to.8  Still, the meaning of his argument about Islam and democracy in
Iraq cannot be severed from troubling questions about Americas newly forged
commitment to support the growth of democratic movements and institutions
in every nation and culture.9  Professor Feldman seems to share the Presidents
faith in an active policy of promoting democracy in Islamic societies.
Of course, building Iraqi democracy was not the objective that the President
initially articulated as a reason for attacking Saddam Husseins regime.  As in
most cases of American military action, the United States claimed that it went
to war for its own security and that of its allies.  The President explained that
invasion was necessary because
[o]ur friends and allies will not live at the mercy of an outlaw regime
that threatens the peace with weapons of mass murder.  We will
meet that threat now, with our Army, Air Force, Navy, Coast Guard
and Marines, so that we do not have to meet it later with armies of
fire fighters and police and doctors on the streets of our cities.10
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11. BOB WOODWARD, PLAN OF ATTACK 92-93, 196-97, 189-90 (2004) (reporting that in
President Bushs 2002 State of the Union message, [t]he theme of promoting democracy, the
rule of law, free speech, religious tolerance and womens rights in the Islamic world had been
watered down in the final version of the speech, reporting that American intelligence agencies
were uncertain whether to claim that Iraq probably had weapons of mass destruction, and
reporting on the Presidents unequivocal charge about [weapons of mass destruction]
programs).
12. U.S. Team Ends Iraq Arms Search, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2005, at 16 (reporting the
American weapons inspectors  central conclusions that Iraq did not possess illicit weapons
at the time of the American invasion); see also Dafna Linzer, Search for Banned Arms in Iraq
Ended Last Month, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2005, at A1 (reporting that the inspectors interim
report would be the final report, and that it contradicted nearly every prewar assertion about
Iraq made by top Bush administration officials).
13. Dana Priest, Iraq New Terror Breeding Ground: War Created Haven, CIA Advisers
Report, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2005, at A1.  Professor Feldman acknowledges the fear that
weak or failing states are breeding grounds for nonstate violence.  FELDMAN, WHAT WE OWE
IRAQ, supra note 3, at 11.  Also, [t]he invasion and its aftermath . . . inaugurated a rich, new
potential breeding environment for terror.  Id. at 13.  But support for autocratic strong
states is not an answer.  Instead, Professor Feldman defends
a strategy of nation building aimed at creating democratically legitimate states
that would treat their citizens with dignity and respect, and in which political
change could be brought about via party politics, not extralegal violence.  States
like these would be less likely to give rise to broadly supported terrorist
movements that might end up harming us.
Id. at 17.
14. See, e.g., RICHARD A. CLARKE, AGAINST ALL ENEMIES: INSIDE AMERICAS WAR ON
TERROR (2004) (arguing that the Bush administrations unilateral policy, including the Iraqi
War, will undermine American antiterrorism efforts and lead to more attacks on Americans
and American interests around the world); MICHAEL SCHEUER (ANONYMOUS), IMPERIAL
The emphasis was on Americas new understanding of its own vulnerability to
terrorist attack and on allegations that Saddam was ready, willing, and able to
supply terrorists with weapons of mass destruction.11
In the weeks between the reelection of President George W. Bush and his
second inauguration, headlines seemed to validate the administrations critics.
The administration stopped its futile search for weapons of mass destruction
and surrendered to the apparent truth that its primary justification for attacking
the regime of Saddam Hussein was false.12  Worse, one apparent effect of
American military efforts has been to transform Iraq into a breeding ground
for terrorists, including allies of the murderers who attacked the World Trade
Center in New York City and the capital city of the United States on September
11, 2001.13  It seemed as if events were confirming the fears of dissenting
elements within the executive branch that the Iraq venture was a step backward
in the war against terror, not an effective strategic or tactical response to
Americas Islamic enemies.14
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HUBRIS: WHY THE WEST IS LOSING THE WAR ON TERROR (2004) (arguing that practical policy
differences between the Islamic world and the United States account for friction and
hostilities). 
15. Jim VandeHei & Michael A. Fletcher, Bush Says Election Ratified Iraq Policy, WASH.
POST, Jan. 16, 2005, at A1.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Robin Wright & Jim VandeHei, U.S. Lowers Expectations on Iraq Vote, WASH. POST,
Jan. 13, 2005, at A1.
19. Jackie Spinner, Allawi Says Violence May Impede Voters, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2005,
at A16; see also Christine Hauser, Under Fire, Election Workers in Iraq Are Scared but
Resolute, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2005, at A1.
20. Anthony Shadid, Iraqis Defy Threats as Millions Vote, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2005,
at A1.
21. See generally FELDMAN, AFTER JIHAD, supra note 3.
22. See generally FELDMAN, WHAT WE OWE IRAQ, supra note 3.
Still, the President had won reelection, however narrowly, and days before
his inauguration, he argued that we had an accountability moment, and thats
called the 2004 elections.15  So, there was no reason, he said, to hold
administration officials accountable for errors in planning for the wars
aftermath.16  The President promised to renew his efforts to spread democracy
around the globe.17  It seemed that despite bad news and ongoing criticism, the
transformation of American effort from a security mission to a crusade (with
all that word connotes) for democracy was complete, permanent and, in the
Presidents view, not to be questioned further.
The bad news of December and January (as well as conflicting assessments
and developments of the winter and spring) hopefully reflect temporary setbacks
and problems.  In the last days before the Presidents inauguration, the
administration was lowering expectations about the scheduled Iraqi
constitutional assembly elections,18 and many commentators worried that much
of the country was not secure to permit safe voting.19  Yet turnout was far better
than expected, and terrorist attacks were less effective than feared.20  At a
minimum, the Iraqi people convincingly demonstrated that they desired the right
to govern themselves.  Recent events in Iraq neither prove nor disprove
Professor Feldmans thesis that Islam and democracy are compatible.21  Even
for those who agree America owes Iraq a chance to develop a viable democracy
after removing Saddam by force,22 it is difficult to predict with confidence
that the Ayatollah and America will get their way in developing an enduring,
reliable democratic practice in Iraq.
Apart from news reports, there are two sources for worry that Americas
venture in Iraq may not result in a stable, responsible democracy.  First, though
one accountability moment may have passed, there are reasons  primarily
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23. See generally FELDMAN, AFTER JIHAD, supra note 3; see also id. at 31-37.
24. President George Washington, Farewell Address, in DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN
HISTORY 174 (Henry Steele Commager ed., 1968).
25. See id.
26. Compare JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, SURPRISE, SECURITY AND THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
(2004) (arguing that Bush administration policy after the September 11 attacks is consistent
with a nineteenth-century foreign policy of preemption, unilateralism, and hegemony
systemic and constitutional  to doubt and question the durability and
reliability of Americas commitment to Middle Eastern democratic nation-
building.  Second, the continuing use of the word democracy along with
claims about its simplicity, universality, mobility, and flexibility23 overlook the
complexity, peculiarity, and uncertain exportability of the American republican
experience.
I
Despite promises from many American politicians who became presidents,
this nation has frequently engaged in war.  Military action abroad, however,
usually has triggered deeply rooted doubts among the people about foreign
involvement.  The roots of American reluctance to undertake international roles
trace back to George Washington:
The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in
extending our commercial relations to have with them as little
political connection as possible . . . . Europe has a set of primary
interests which to us have none or a very remote relation.  Hence she
must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are
essentially foreign to our concerns.  Hence, therefore, it must be
unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary
vicissitudes of her politics or the ordinary combinations and
collisions of her friendships or enmities.  Our detached and distant
situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course . . . .
Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation?24
President Washington focused on relations with old Europe, and his words
reflected a confidence in the security of America far out of reach of potential
enemies.  Pearl Harbor and September 11, as well as several generations of
American life under the shadow of potential nuclear attack, have undermined
the continuing relevance of Washingtons views.  But our constitutional
structure reflects the early expectations and hopes of an America confident
about so peculiar a situation.25  Washingtons attitude and words resembled
a unilateralism and nationalistic isolationism that has, more often than not,
characterized American foreign policy.26  When Japan attacked Pearl Harbor,
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expanded from the Western Hemisphere to the entire globe), with ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER,
JR., WAR AND THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 3, 21 (2004) (arguing that unilateralism is the
oldest doctrine in American foreign policy, but the Bush transformations repudiated the
strategy that won the Cold War  the combination of containment and deterrence).
27. SCHLESINGER, supra note 26, at 10. 
28. Id.
29. JAMES MADISON, THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 418-19 (1987);
see, e.g., Charles A. Lofgren, War Making Under the Constitution:  The Original Understand-
ing, 81 YALE L.J. 672, 701 (1972) (arguing that the framers and ratifiers intended the president
would possess latitude for defense against imminent invasion, while the Congress would share
a coordinate and perhaps dominant responsibility for initiating all but the most obviously
defensive wars, whether declared or not).
30. Lofgren, supra note 29, at 701.
31. THE FEDERALIST No. 69 (Alexander Hamilton).
more Americans than ever before were shocked into rethinking their relationship
with the world.  The disaster settled a debate between interventionists, led by
a visionary Franklin D. Roosevelt who saw America and the world as
interdependent, versus isolationists who thought America was secure between
the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.27  However, if Pearl Harbor vindicat[ed]
internationalism, it did not vanquish isolationism.28  Blunders such as Vietnam
restored some of the traditional American feeling for remaining unentangled, or
at least pretending to.  Interventions abroad once again became politically risky,
particularly if lives of American soldiers were at risk.
America first thinking is reinforced by our constitutional structure, by the
doctrine of the separation of powers, and by our democratic character.  The
framers chose to divide responsibility for war between the president and
Congress.  The original draft of the document had assigned to Congress the
power to make war, but even when the Convention amended the language to
give Congress power to declare war, and spoke of the need to allow a
president to respond to military attack, they never expected to hear in a
republic a motion to empower the Executive alone to declare war.29
Divided presidential-congressional authority for military action reflects the
twin Madisonian ideas of a separation of powers and a system of checks and
balances.30  The strategy was to limit the president  the chief executive and
the commander-in-chief  whose power might threaten autocracy.  On this
point, the framers were explicit.  As Alexander Hamilton promised, writing in
the guise of Publius, the presidents role would amount to nothing more than
the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces . . . while
that of the British king extends to the declaring of war . . . which, by the
Constitution under consideration would appertain to the legislature.31
Realities have intruded on the confidence of the framers that no one man
could initiate a war.  The Constitution was written to provide a national
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33. Id.
government with competent powers for the execution of sovereign functions.
And the vulnerability of American territory to foreign attack with little time to
prepare is the overriding security concern of the modern age.  Defenders of a
separate and independent presidential duty can trace their argument to
understandings and hopes that the American president would not be feeble.
They explained their choice for a single executive as a desire for energy,
unity, competent powers, a due dependence on the people, a due
responsibility, as well as virtues more frequently associated with national
security functions  [d]ecision, activity, secrecy and dispatch.32  Presidents
have consolidated their authority over foreign policy with claims to superior
expertise, greater competence, and better information.  Of these ideas, a critical
factor is democracy and popular accountability.  War requires a broad
institutional and popular consensus.  In The Federalist, Alexander Hamilton
defends the unity of the executive not only on grounds of efficient government,
but also as a means of fostering political accountability:  when the president
speaks and acts, there can be no doubt as to responsibility for the course of
policy, and no obstacle to the imposition of censure or punishment for failures.33
But democracy and accountability also create problems.  If consensus is
required for action, efficiency may be sacrificed to the slow process of public
education.  Also, if the consensus is fragile, perhaps because the president has
not spoken clearly or accurately, the American president may find a
deterioration in political support.  Compare two observations years apart.  First,
in 1835, Alexis de Tocqueville said:
I do not hesitate to say that it is especially in the conduct of their
foreign relations that democracies appear to me decidedly inferior to
other governments.  Experience, instruction, and habit almost
always succeed in creating in a democracy a homely species of
practical wisdom and that science of the petty occurrences of life
which is called good sense.  Good sense may suffice to direct the
ordinary course of society; and among a people whose education is
completed, the advantages of democratic liberty in the internal
affairs of the country may more than compensate for the evils
inherent in a democratic government.  But it is not always so in the
relations with foreign nations.
Foreign politics demand scarcely any of those qualities which are
peculiar to a democracy; they require, on the contrary, the perfect
use of almost all those in which it is deficient.  Democracy is
favorable to the increase of the internal resources of a state; it
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34. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 234-35 (Phillips Bradley trans.
1994) (1831).
35.  FERGUSON, supra note 5, at 293.  In Fergusons view, the problem is not just that
America is democratic; the problem is that America disclaims its status as an empire, though
a different kind of empire, a liberal empire, with ongoing responsibilities to defend
capitalism and democracy.  Id. at 293-95.  Ferguson stated:
The trouble with an empire in denial is that it tends to make two mistakes when
it chooses to intervene in the affairs of lesser states.  The first may be to allocate
insufficient resources to the nonmilitary aspects of the project. The second, and
the more serious, is to attempt economic and political transformation in an
unrealistically short time frame . . . . By insisting  and apparently intending 
that they will remain in Iraq only until a democratic government can be
established and not a day longer, American spokespeople have unintentionally
created a further disincentive for local people to cooperate with them.
Id.
diffuses wealth and comfort, promotes public spirit, and fortifies the
respect for law . . . .  But a democracy can only with great difficulty
regulate the details of an important undertaking, persevere in a fixed
design, and work out its execution in spite of serious obstacles.  It
cannot combine its measures with secrecy or await their
consequences with patience.34
As is often true, the prophetic insights of Tocqueville speak clearly to the
dilemmas of the present.  In the early years of the twenty-first century, another
foreign observer, British historian Niall Ferguson, reached similar conclusions:
[Americas] attention deficit . . . seems to be inherent in the American political
system and . . . already threatens to call a premature halt to reconstruction in
both Iraq and Afghanistan. . . . The problem is systemic; it is the way the
political process militates against farsighted leadership.35
In this context, a separation of powers and a democratic dependence on the
people for the power to govern often lead to compromise, indecision, and
faltering leadership.  The people must be led:  they must be taught to support
what needs to be done.  Perhaps it is too early to conclude that the Iraq
experience is a bad moment for those who believe that presidents of the United
States can lead a liberal empire to develop a wise, enduring foreign policy in
defense of democratic values.  But we have many examples from history to
justify skepticism.  The role of constitutional structure, however, can be
overestimated; perhaps the reasons are tied closer to the nature of human beings
and the tendency of democracies to seek to make the people content.  Walter
Lippmann argued so:
Now the momentous equations of war and peace, of solvency, of
security and of order, always have a harder or a softer, a pleasanter
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36. WALTER LIPPMANN, THE PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 45-46 (1955).
37. SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL:  AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE
xviii (2002).
38. Id. at xxi (internal citation omitted).
or a more painful, a popular or an unpopular option. It is easier to
obtain votes for appropriations than it is for taxes, to facilitate
consumption than to stimulate production, to protect a market than
to open it, to inflate than to deflate, to borrow than to save, to
demand than to compromise, to be intransigent than to negotiate, to
threaten war than to prepare for it.
Faced with these choices between the hard and the soft, the
normal propensity of democratic governments is to please the largest
number of voters.  The pressure of the electorate is normally for the
soft side of the equations.  That is why governments are unable to
cope with reality when elected assemblies and mass opinions become
decisive in the state, when there are no statesmen to resist the
inclination of the voters and there are only politicians to excite and
to exploit them.
There is then a general tendency to be drawn downward, as by the
force of gravity, towards insolvency, towards the insecurity of
factionalism, towards the erosion of liberty, and towards hyperbolic
wars.36
One pattern from American history underscores Lippmanns assessment.
How can any president promise that the United States will have the will, the
determination, and the endurance to make sure that peoples in every nation and
culture will someday enjoy the right to vote, speak, and worship according to
their own conscience, if we have shown utterly no capacity to make sure that
they will enjoy the right to live?  America has done little to stop genocide.
Indeed, [i]t is in the realm of domestic politics that the battle to stop genocide
is lost.37  Worse,
[i]t is daunting to acknowledge, but this countrys consistent policy
of nonintervention in the face of genocide offers sad testimony not
to a broken American political system but to one that is ruthlessly
effective.  The system, as it stands now, is working.  No U.S.
president has ever made genocide prevention a priority, and no U.S.
president has ever suffered politically for his indifference to its
occurrence.38
Like a fight for world democracy, a fight against genocide requires constancy,
but America has shown little or no capacity to continue to fight a painful,
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39. President Bush is not the first chief executive to offer sweeping and beautiful language
designed to inspire, but less certain as a basis for policy.  John F. Kennedy spoke of a long
twilight struggle, year in and year out, rejoicing in hope, patient in tribulation  a struggle
against the common enemies of man: tyranny, poverty, disease, and war itself.  John F.
Kennedy, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1961).  He also said: Let every nation know, whether
it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship,
support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty.
Id.  Whatever message Kennedy intended, his words never sounded the same after Vietnam.
40. A single scholars interpretation of a single moment in history hardly proves a
historical pattern, but a biographer of Theodore Roosevelt draws a lesson similar to
Tocquevilles assessment.  H.W. Brands described President Roosevelts change of heart
regarding Americas mission to bring democracy to the Philippines after the Spanish-American
War of 1898:
Roosevelt recognized that he had misjudged the Filipinos, but, more to the point,
he recognized that he had misjudged the American people. He had thought
Americans would become as enamored of their country's civilizing mission as he
was; only when he realized that they hadnt, and wouldn't, did he throw in the
towel on American imperialism. And this is the crucial lesson of history for the
present. George W. Bush can be as resolute as he wants regarding Iraq, vowing
to finish the job the United States started there. But the fundamental constraint
on policy is, and always has been, the resolve of the American people. Americans
followed the lead of the imperialists in 1898 only to turn back when they
discovered that empire was more expensive and less rewarding than the
imperialists had told them it would be. Iraq isn't the Philippines, but the
American people are the American people, and there is little reason to think
they'll bear the cost of empire more patiently now than they did then. The clock
is ticking for Bush; his heel of Achilles moment awaits.
H.W. Brands, Dont Know Much About History, WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 2004, at T5 (reviewing
JUDIS, supra note 7).
41. POWER, supra note 37, at 508.
difficult twilight struggle39 when its own interests were not at risk.40  When
the issue was genocide,
American leaders did not act because they did not want to.  They
believed that genocide was wrong, but they were not prepared to
invest the military, financial, diplomatic, or domestic political
capital needed to stop it.  The U.S. policies . . . were not the
accidental products of neglect.  They were concrete choices made by
this countrys most influential decisionmakers after unspoken and
explicit weighing of costs and benefits.41
Put another way, America will choose to be a liberal empire only when
presidents convince voters that their security interests justify it.  What are the
chances that past patterns of isolationist thought and domestic preoccupation
will be broken?  Bold rhetoric will not be enough.  National will cannot be
based on uncertain explanations of motive or confusing claims about security
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43. Id. at 89. 
44. Id.
45. FRED ANDERSON & ANDREW CLAYTON: THE DOMINION OF WAR: EMPIRE AND LIBERTY
threats, ambiguous talk of guilt for terrorist attacks, or a blunt, dramatic new
national security strategy of preemptive or preventive war.  Neither the
debate before the Iraqi war nor the debate during the 2004 presidential election
focused on the profound implications of a new commitment to world
democracy.  Democracy has yet to forge a reliable foundation for a new foreign
policy to make the world over for democracy.
In an essay on the significance and lessons of World War II, George F.
Kennan challenged the deeper failure of understanding, a failure to appreciate
the limitations of war in general  any war  as a vehicle for the achievement
of the objectives of the democratic state.42  In terms that seem tragically absent
from current debate about war, Kennan argued: It is essential to recognize that
the maiming and killing of men and the destruction of human shelters and other
installations, however necessary it may be for other reasons, cannot in itself
make a positive contribution to any democratic purpose.43  Kennan, of course,
was no pacifist and he recognized that violence might be necessary before
progress can be made.
But, basically, the democratic purpose does not prosper when a man
dies or a building collapses or an enemy force retreats.  It may be
hard for it to prosper unless these things happen . . . .  But the actual
prospering occurs only when something happens in a mans mind
that increases his enlightenment and the consciousness of his real
relation to other people  something that makes him aware that,
whenever the dignity of another man is offended, his own dignity, as
a man among men, is thereby reduced.  And this is why the
destructive process of war must always be accompanied by, or made
subsidiary to, a different sort of undertaking aimed at widening the
horizons and changing the motives of men and should never thought
of in itself as a proper vehicle for hopes and enthusiasms and dreams
of world improvement.44
Kennans analysis illuminates why, in Iraq, our nation faces resistance.  Our
forces confront a nationalist insurgency that may ultimately choose a
democratic tradition on its own, but is entirely unwilling to see it imposed by
foreigners and infidels.  Whether justified by promises of liberation or not,
coercion and conquest foster fear, resentment, and a desire for revenge much
more reliably than they promote understanding and respect in the conquered for
the values of the conqueror.45
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II
In his second inaugural address, President Bush sounded a trumpet of
idealistic determination that resembles Professor Feldmans hopeful assessment
about the future of democracy in Iraq and the rest of the Islamic world.
Without focus on any particular part of the world, Bush proclaimed:
Democratic reformers facing repression, prison, or exile can know: America
sees you for who you are: the future leaders of your free country.46  One can
only imagine what a Nelson Mandela or a student protester from the 1989
Tianamen Square clash between Red Chinas military and reformers must
have thought upon hearing reports of the Presidents words, or the quick efforts
of administration officials to explain that his soaring rhetoric represents no
significant shift in U.S. foreign policy.47  Perhaps not, but the rhetoric sounds
like the President clings to a conviction . . . that the unique position of the
United States as the planets supreme military, economic, and cultural power
creates an unprecedented opportunity for America to impose its values on other
countries and thereby save them from themselves.48
A reality check requires awareness of the complexity of the values we
cherish.  The finest words of Americas constitutional tradition  democracy,
freedom, justice, and so many others  stir emotion, but they are not the
simple, elegant concepts that Professor Feldman champions as universal,
mobile ideas.49  True, they speak to the ideals of many throughout the world
and reflect noble aspirations.  And true, scholarly complications need not cloud
the basic message of a mobile idea, which will maintain its simplicity despite
the best efforts of scholars to multiply complications.50  At risk of my showing
an academics tendency to see intricacy instead of simplicity, clouds on
message are not the point.  The true challenge facing America and all advocates
of democracy in every nation or culture is in the details of implementation.
Our celebrations of democracy as the certain end of human progress are
speculative estimates and an uncertain focus for a pragmatic diplomacy.  A
majority of the worlds inhabitants may be living under democracy, but
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democratic hegemony is a mere flash in the long, sad annals of recorded
history.51
Americas republican experiment is not simple or elegant or even pure
democratic theory.52  And in the short run  which may be all an America
with attention deficit may have  the American elements are not easily or even
feasibly exportable, particularly by means of bombs, bullets, and bayonets.
Complexities are apparent even if one simply focuses on the American tradition
 without regard to the factionalism53 and zeal of elements of Iraqi culture.
If one tries to sum up the basic version of [a mobile] idea in a sentence or
two that almost everyone can understand,54 one has not taken a serious step
toward implementation of that idea.  Professor Feldman argues: Democracy . .
. may be summed up in brief.  Although emphases vary, nearly everyone would
agree that democracy involves . . . choosing leaders and making political
decisions on the basis of competition for the peoples votes.55  This statement
may have the virtue of simple elegance, but it falls far short of an adequate
description of a governing idea in America.  Even a brief statement of the
American republican tradition hints at complexities and controversies.  To
begin, democracy is not the same as voting or elections.  It involves not
only popular accountability, but also a genuine sharing of power to direct the
course of a community.
How does a popular election and majority rule account for minority rights?
Jeffersons famous definition of this sacred principle was that though the
will of the majority is in all cases to prevail, that will to be rightful must be
reasonable; that the minority possess their equal rights, which equal law must
protect, and to violate would be oppression.56  Americas commitment to
democracy is a belief that the system of government is the best means to
promote unalienable rights.  Even after seeing a potential compatibility
between Islamic traditions and democratic traditions, it is difficult to predict
with confidence a triumph of liberal democracy in a reasonably near future.
It is difficult to detect examples of any Islamic society embracing a theory of
individual rights with any passing resemblance to the concepts of equality of
rights in the Declaration of Independence,57 though they have had much more
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time to evolve toward an end of history.
How does majority rule, even qualified with equal minority rights, account
for stability, order, and a more perfect union?  James Madisons careful,
clear-headed, practical thinking is hard to summarize in a brief idea, but a
separation of powers between executive, legislative, and judicial branches along
with federalism, divided sovereignty, and other checks and balances seems
essential to explaining the republican ideal in Americas past and present.58
Pure democratic theory does not.
The issue of religion is an example of the paradox:  democracy depends on
constitutional limits on majority will.  When Madison reflected on the dangers
of factionalism to Americas republican experiment, he worried about the
effects of religious passion and zeal:
The latent causes of faction are . . . sown in the nature of man. . . .
A zeal for different opinions concerning religion . . . and many other
points . . . have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them
with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to
vex and oppress each other than to co-operate for their common
good.59
Americans debate the substance of his thinking, and even conservative
originalists have begun to distance themselves from Madisonian solutions to the
issues of religious freedom.60  Still, it is essential to recall several accepted
elements of Madisons careful thinking.
First, religion [and government] will both exist in greater purity, the less
they are mixed together.61  Second, government has a duty to respect the
privacy and sanctity of the individual relationship between a human being and
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his God.  As a believer, Madison wrote that a persons duty to God is
precedent, both in order of time and in degree of obligation, to the claims of
Civil Society.62  And so, he reasoned, [t]he Religion . . . of every man must
be left to the conviction and conscience of every man; and it is the right of every
man to exercise it as these may dictate. . . .  It is the duty of every man to render
to the Creator such homage, and such only as he believes to be acceptable to
him.63  Third, the benefits of an intellectual and spiritual autonomy to be
enjoyed by the individual were also to be enjoyed by nonbelievers.64  If America
was to enjoy the undeniable and inestimable benefits of religion and its
teachings for individual virtue and morality, as well as justice, religion was to
remain private  not secret  exerting its influence through the community by
persuasion and by example.  America has difficulty enough maintaining these
principles against the passions of majorities and the plotting of vote-seeking
politicians.65
Professor Feldman argues  with far more authority, experience, and
learning than I  that similar fusions of democracy and liberty are possible in
Islamic society because of Islamic law.66  Yet others see a more ominous
outlook.  The Arab world today is trapped between autocratic states and
illiberal societies, neither of them fertile ground for liberal democracy.  The
dangerous dynamic between these two forces has produced a political climate
filled with religious extremism and violence.67  The point is not that America
ought to run and hide from these challenges.  Rather, an assumption about
potential and theoretical compatibility is not a wise basis for a foreign policy
plan, which ought to avoid risk and gambles.
Of course, Professor Feldman understands this and much, much more, as his
lecture, article, and two books demonstrate.  In many respects, the elements of
skepticism expressed in this essay are suggested and even endorsed elsewhere
in Professor Feldmans writing.  But the optimistic elements of his assessment
of the democratic fatwa do not emphasize these complexities which, in my
view, go to the heart of successful constitution-drafting and nation-building.  As
Professor Feldman states, Americas solutions to the problems of democracy,
equality, liberty, and stability are not the only solutions or even the best
solutions for the Islamic world.  So my confusion focuses on the thinking and
the mysteries of recent presidential remarks, with special worry about the
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refrains of democracy and freedom as an explanation of a rational, realistic,
trustworthy foreign policy.
If democracy is a natural right of human beings, it is not Americas gift.  It
is something that Iraq must choose, embrace, and adapt for itself.68  And so, this
confused citizen is torn between two thoughts.  First, even if we have blundered
in Iraq, we have no choice except to keep our promises and obligations, and that
requires an enormous price in human life, national treasure, and patience.
Having thrust Iraqis into this situation, we have an obligation to enable them
to climb out of it.69  But second, our nation cannot rely on the doubtful notion
that democracy is a simple and elegant idea.  Democracy is complicated and
messy.  The ideal provides uncertain focus and guidance for the pragmatic and
realistic policies that must always characterize American foreign policy. 
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